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Summary 
In this paper, we basically made efforts to answer 3 questions: （1）What is the geographic 
distribution of human capital in China?  (2) How the regional differences of human capital 
change over time? (3) What are the main determinants of geographic distribution of human 
capital? 
To answer the first question, we choose the education attainment approach and build an 
indicator system which includes both a human capital stock indicator and human capital 
structure indicators. Average years of schooling is the human capital stock indicator, and 
percentage of people with higher education, high school education, middle school education, 
primary school education (according to the final education level) and illiteracy rate are the 5 
human capital structure indicators. We collect data of 31 regions from 1997 to 2008, and run 
the cluster analysis. We find that Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai are most developed in human 
capital, and Tibet is ranked the last. Furthermore, northern regions and some central regions 
are better developed in human capital; western regions are generally poor in human capital. 
However, not all economically developed regions have an abundant educated population, like 
Zhenjiang and Fujian; and not all poor regions lack human capital, like Shanxi. 
To answer the second question, we compute the correlated variation of each indicator in the 
observation period. Through comparison among indicators, we find that percentage of people 
with higher education varies most in 31 regions, then the illiteracy rate, then the percentage of 
people with high school education. The correlated variations of the rest indicators are 
relatively small. Meanwhile, the regional difference of illiteracy rate tends to increase during 
the 12 years, and so does the regional difference of percentage of people with primary school 
education. And these two indicators represent the situation of basic education. Regional 
differences of the rest decline. Since it is unreasonable to have a high regional difference in 
illiteracy rate, we compute the results by excluding Tibet again, and find that this change does 
not affect other indicators but do decrease the correlated variation of illiteracy rate. But the 
increasing trend does not change. 
To answer the third question, we do two things. First, we run two panel data regressions. The 
dependent variable of first one is average years of schooling, and of the second one is 
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percentage of the population with higher education. The model we use is the fixed effect 
model including both entity and time fixed effects. Nine regressors are added in and two of 
them are control variables. We find that income, the number of health personnel per 10,000 
inhabitants and the number of street lights per cities are positively related with the two 
dependent variables. The last two are variables reflecting nonpecuniary benefits offered by the 
region. Cost has a negative impact on average years of schooling, but does not affect 
percentage of people with higher education. Government’s education expenditure per person 
does increase average years of schooling in a statistical perspective, but government’s 
expenditure on higher education per student does not affect the percentage of people with 
higher education. The differences in the results of the two regressions may suggest different 
behavior patterns among people with different education backgrounds. The unemployment 
rate is not statistically significant in either of the two regressions. Two possible reasons could 
explain this: first the data we used is not the unemployment rate of educated people, but the 
registered unemployment rate of urban residents, because the first one is not available. 
Secondly, lack of full information may also lead to this result. The other thing we do to 
answer question (3) is constructing an internal migration model to explain the formation of 
human capital in labor force. In this model, people possess different levels of latent ability, 
and have to make two decisions: migration for education and migration for job. Furthermore, 
people assign different weights to nonpecuniary benefits. As a result, education cost, living 
cost is negatively related with human capital stock in that region, on the contrary, starting 
wage offered by employers and nonpecuniary benefits are positively related with human 
capital stock in that region. A brief discussion of preferences is also made. 
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1 Introduction 
Regional gap is an inevitable consequence for developing countries when they experience 
rapid economic transformation and growth. China went on the track of sound economic 
progress after Xiaoping Deng stressed his famous point “let some people become rich first”. 
However, unbalanced development among regions comes as a consequence of the rapid 
growth in the whole nation, and it exists in many aspects. 
It is estimated that there is an "U-shaped” pattern in regional inequality during the reform 
period (1978-1994), measured by the provincial per capita GDP. The diminishing trend is due 
to a significant decline in income inequality among provinces in the coastal regions, and on 
the other hand, the rising GDP in the southern coastal belt also leads to widening regional 
disparity between costal and internal regions (Ying, 1999). At the same time, the income gap 
between rural areas and cities also appeared, and caused a large-scale rural-to-urban migration 
(Zhang and Meng, 2010). This migration trend partially contributes to the segmentation in 
urban labor market. Most migrants are not granted urban citizenship and treated as “outsiders”; 
while a few of them who can be considered as “elites” are able to obtain permanent resident 
permit; It is found hat in terms of human capital attributes, mobility resources, and labor 
market entry and shifts, permanent migrants are the most privileged and successful elite, 
followed by non-migrant natives, and finally by temporary migrants at the bottom of the 
hierarchy (Fan, 2002). However, rural migrants can not obtain wage comparable to their urban 
counterparts in their life time, and most importantly, even well-educated rural migrants do not 
seem to have a significant advantage comparing to the poorly-educated ones (Zhang and 
Meng et.al, 2009). 
In such a scenario, with widening regional income gap, large scale of migration trend and 
segmentation of labor market, different regions exhibit different ability in human capital 
accumulation. However, the unbalanced development in human capital seems not a very 
attractive academic topic to researchers. On the other hand, the fact of unbalanced 
development in human capital among regions has been well noticed. In western regions of 
China, drop-out rate from schooling is higher than average, especially in rural areas (Li, 2010). 
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For some poor regions, most of which are located in the western part, it is even difficult to 
find qualified teachers or health personnel, because of a serious out-flow of educated people 
(Yang, 2010). And college students from different regions gather in big cities like Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou. All of these facts contribute to the unequal geographic distribution 
of human capital. Indeed, to some extent, the unequal distribution of human capital has led to 
the failure of Xiaoping Deng’s another principle, which is “Material civilization and spiritual 
civilization should run neck and neck.” 
Therefore, there are actually sound academic and practical ground for a careful research on 
the geographic distribution of human capital and its determinants. On one hand, the effect of 
human capital on economic growth has been proved to be positive both by new growth theory 
and empirical studies in China (Fleisher et al., 2010). On the other hand, human capital 
accumulation is a main theme of the human development for individuals, and also a major 
element of “spiritual civilization”. Thus, if we can picture a clear map of the geographic 
distribution of human capital, and find out the underlying determinants, it will help to balance 
the development among regions. 
There are some attempts to describe the unequal distribution of human capital in China. And a 
common approach is to calculate the average years of schooling. Because of the data 
limitation, the average years of schooling in labor force is not available, only the average 
years of schooling among people aged over six can be calculated. Furthermore, some studies 
divided regions into several groups according to geographic locations, such as northern part, 
eastern part, central part and western part, and studied how each group differs in the average 
years of schooling, government’s education expenditure and etc (Liu et al., 2008).Some 
studies used cluster analysis and categorized regions into several clusters. The first approach 
focus on the geographic location, but regions in the same group may differ a lot in human 
capital stock. The second approach is more helpful, but in previous studies, the variables used 
in cluster analysis actually include both economic indicators and human capital indicators. 
For example, some scholars selected per capital GDP and the population ratio of people 
working in agriculture as variables and put them in the cluster analysis of human capital (Xu 
and Wang, 2006). This mix-up of indicators could not reflect the pure difference of human 
capital exactly. Thus, building a new indicator system is necessary, which only includes 
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human capital indicators and reflects the situations of both human capital stock and human 
capital structure. 
On the other hand, it is of our interests to see how regional difference in human capital has 
changed with time. There are not many relevant researches. Chen, Zhao has studied the 
evolution of regional difference in human capital during 1987-2001 through comparing the 
correlated variance of some selected indicators (Chen et al., 2004). However, the observation 
period is relatively far from present. Therefore, to examine the recent trend of regional 
difference in human capital is another task of this paper. We use the data from 1997 to 2008, 
compute the correlated variation of all the 6 indicators, and make comparison among 
indicators in the same year and among different years for the same indicator.  
It is also of great importance to understand how related characteristics in a certain region 
affect the human capital stock there, since it will help local government to make well-targeted 
policies. However, related empirical study is rare. Furthermore, even for the existing 
researches, there are still some improvements we can make. For example, Yang, Yang 
collected the data of 2008 and checked several potential factors which may affect human 
capital difference among regions (Yang, 2009). But regressions based on one year’s data 
could not eliminate omitted variable bias, which is resulted from failing to include some 
regional and time effects. In this case, panel data regression is an useful tool (Stock and 
Watson, 2007), and is also the approach we will adopt in this paper. The panel data covers 31 
regions and includes 11 years. Dependent variables are average years of schooling and the 
percentage of people with higher education. Independent variables are those which have 
economic implications, such as income, cost, unemployment rate and etc. Panel data 
regression enables to reduce certain types of omitted variables, but not all of them. As a result, 
two control variables are added: the first one reflects the student ratio in the whole population, 
which is positively related with both income and the dependent variable; the second one 
reflects the population structure, since it is the average year of schooling among population 
aged over six we have used, population structure has a significant impact on the dependent 
variable, and also correlated with student ratio. Population structure is also correlated the 
average annual income as well as expenditures since different age groups have different 
earning abilities and consumptional habits. Despite of the efforts above, validity problems 
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may still exist, especially the simultaneous causality problem, thus we also make a discussion 
of them and further improvement is appreciated.  
As we mentioned before, due to the data limitation, we can only focus on the human capital 
embedded in the population aged over six, and could not examine the human capital 
embedded in labor force. Consequently, a theoretical model may help to further our 
understanding of the human capital difference in labor force among regions. In fact, previous 
papers in human capital investment and international brain drain provided some inspirations, 
but are not able to answer the question directly. Because two process contribute to the 
formation of human capital in labor force in a region: migration for education and migration 
for jobs. The second one is often discussed in papers about international migration, but the 
first one is not, due to the differences in settings between international migration and internal 
migration. Thus, we will incorporate the two processes and construct an internal migration 
model to explain the formation of human capital in labor force in a certain region.   
Based on the discussion above, the rest of the thesis is organized as follows: in chapter 2, we 
discuss the approach to measure human capital stock as well as human capital structure, and 
then select proper indicators. Thereafter, necessary data is collected; a cluster analysis based 
on the data is done and the 31 regions will be categorized into several types according to their 
situations of human capital stock and structure. In chapter 3, we examine how regional 
differences in human capital have changed during 1997-2008. In chapter 4, we run the panel 
data regression against to two dependent variables: one is average years of schooling; the 
other is percentage of people with higher education. In chapter 5, an internal migration model 
is given, and the mechanisms which affect human capital formation in labor force are revealed. 
In the last chapter, based on the conclusion of this paper some suggestions are made.  
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2 Geographic distribution of human capital in China  
2.1 Measurement 
Adam Smith defined four fixed capitals in production: machines, buildings, land, and the last 
one is “the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants or members of the society” 
(Smith, 1776). This can be considered as early understanding of human capital. “Human 
capital” was first used as a term in an article by Arthur Cecil Pigou in 1928, and was 
developed to a modern theory under the efforts of Jacob Mincer, Gary Becker and T. W. 
Schultz at the University of Chicago in 1960s. According to Becker, “Activities that influence 
future monetary and psychic income by increasing the resources in people [...] are called 
investments in human capital.” (Becker,1964). Although this definition has been extended or 
modified by researchers later, the three major issues related to human capital has not changed: 
1) Human capital is embodied in individuals:  
2) Human capital was formed by past investment; 
3) Human capital influences future income. 
There are also the three principles to follow when discussing the measurements of human 
capital. Thus, we can categorize approaches of measuring human capital into 3 types: the 
cost-based approach, the income-based approach, and the educational attainment approach. To 
select a proper approach to measure human capital, we should have a careful comparison of 
the three approaches first. 
The cost-based approach: Some scholars also call it “the retrospective approach”. This 
approach estimates the past cost of “producing” an individual, including both tangible and 
intangible costs, such as nutrition, expenditure on health, education and training. A problem 
associated with this approach is how to identify each kind of cost clearly. The other drawback 
is it ignored the social cost which also contributes to the accumulation of individual’s 
knowledge and skills, such as government education subsidy, etc.   
The income-based approach: Since human capital is a factor of producing economic value, 
another way of measuring it is to estimate the present value of the future benefits. This 
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approach has a higher requirement of data, for example, earnings and employment rate by 
education, which is not usually available in developing countries. 
The educational attainment approach: Jacob Mincer, Gary Becker and T. W. Schultz modeled 
human capital investment as individuals’ rational choice in their papers in the middle of 20th 
century. This also led to a new approach of measuring the quantity of human capital; that is 
using several education-related indexes, including average years of schooling, the ratio of 
people with certain level of education, the student-teacher ratio, etc. Those approaches have 
some drawbacks. For example, average years of schooling disregards the quality differences 
among each education level, and also failed to take on-job-training into account. However, this 
approach has a relatively lower requirement in data, and that is why it was used by many 
researchers in China. 
Keeping all those advantages and disadvantages in mind, and taking data availability into 
account, we finally choose to follow the third approach: the educational attainment approach. 
Now we have the proper approach, and there are still two questions to be answered before we 
start the data collection. The first question is “human capital of which group”. As we 
mentioned before, most papers and publications in this field are about the relationship 
between human capital and economic growth. And in this scenario, “human capital” is the 
human capital in workforce, which has direct connection with production. However, we do 
not have relevant data to compute the human capital in workforce in China. Various 
yearbooks only provide the information of educational attainment in people aged over six, 
which includes both labor force and children. Thus, it is impossible to distinguish labor force 
from children based on this information. Besides, this method has its own disadvantages. First, 
it is difficult to draw a simple line between workforce and non-workforce according to age. 
Some scholars use the data of people who are above 15, and some think it should be above 25. 
In fact, this disadvantage becomes a more serious problem when we study the situation in 
developing countries, because some children drop out from school very early and work 
illegally. Furthermore, our study here is about human capital itself, not the relationship with 
other variables. Thus, it is reasonable to take into account the human capital of all people who 
are eligible for education, not solely the human capital of workforce. Based on discussion 
above, we finally choose people aged above six as the target group in empirical study. 
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Nevertheless, we will use a separate chapter to discuss the determinants of geographic 
distribution of human capital in labor force, by constructing a theoretical model. 
The second question is what kind of indicators we should use to describe the human capital. 
On one hand, human capital is a concept of “stock”, so it is very nature to use some stock 
indicators. And on the other hand, indicators of stock usually disregard some fundamental 
characteristics of the variable, like structure. So besides the indicators of stock, we also need 
some other indicators which will help us to have a deeper insight of human capital. Since we 
use average years of schooling as the stock indicator, the selection of other indicators 
becomes easier: following the educational attainment approach, we can obtain several other 
indicators, which is able to reflect the structure of human capital in a certain region. These 
indicators are: percentages of population holding their highest education level as college or 
above, high school, middle school and primary school respectively, and the illiteracy rate.  
Table 2.1 Summary of the indicators 
Till now, we have constructed an indicator system to evaluate human capital in a certain region. 
And to make things simple, in the following discussions we will call the five structure 
indicators as: percentage of college, percentage of high school, percentage of middle school, 
INDICATORS FORMULA EXPLAINATION 
Average years of schooling 6
it i
t
t
N Y
AYS
N +
⋅= ∑  
Percentage of college 6
ct
t
t
NPOC
N +
=  
Percentage of high school 6
ht
t
t
NPOH
N +
=  
Percentage of middle school 6
mt
t
t
NPOM
N +
=  
Percentage of primary school 6
pt
t
t
N
POP
N +
=  
Illiteracy rate 15
it
t
t
NIC
N +
=  
itN : the number of people with i 
level of education in year t 
(i=c, college; i=h high school; 
i=m middle school; i=p primary 
school; i=i illiteracy) 
iY : years of schooling related to i 
level of education 
6
tN
+
: the number of people who 
aged over 6; 
 
15
tN
+
:the number of people who 
aged over 15 
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percentage of primary school and illiteracy rate. A more specific description is shown in table 
2.1. 
It is worth mention that the 5 structural indicators are not summed to 1, because illiteracy rate 
here is the rate among people who aged over 15, not six. And the reason why we use illiteracy 
rate among people aged over 15 is simply because this data is available in relevant yearbooks. 
2.2 Data description 
With the indicators discussed above, we can now have a look at the geographic distribution of 
human capital in China. China’s Statistic Yearbook provides each region’s illiteracy rate and 
number of people according to different education levels in the previous year, which is the basic 
data for computing the values of indictors. We will compute the values of the indicators for all 
the 31 regions in China, including 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 municipalities. The 
two Special Administrative Regions: Hong Kong and Macau are not included, and Taiwan is 
also not included. According to the formulas in table 2.1, we need the information about the 
duration of each level of education. However, not every region has the same education system. 
For example, primary schools in Shanghai and Hubei Province require only 5-years of study, 
but in most other regions, the requirement is 6 years. Furthermore, even in the same region, 
years of schooling for the same education level may differ. So this makes the determination of 
iY  becomes difficult. The Department of Population and Employment Statistics in National 
Bureau of Statistics of China suggested that: relevant years of schooling for college, high 
school, middle school and primary school can be calculated as 16, 12, 9 and 6 respectively. And 
people who attended the class for eliminating illiteracy can be considered as having accepted 1 
year of education. We will follow this suggestion when computing average years of schooling. 
11 years data are all available in each year’s “China’s Statistic Yearbook”: from 1997 to 2008, 
excerpt data in 2001. Yearbooks before 1997 do not provide any information about number of 
people according to different education levels for each region. And China’s Statistic Yearbook 
in 2002 did not report the relevant data in 2001; instead, it adjusted the data obtained through 
2000’s Census, which has already been revealed in 2001’s yearbook. Thus we choose the 
adjusted data to describe situation in 2000, and no data is available for year 2001.  
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Having a first look of the data, we can get a general understanding of the geographic 
distribution and development of human capital in China.  
Firstly, it is quite obvious that there is a difference in human capital stock among 31 regions. 
Average years of schooling in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai are always in the top rank and 
the values are much bigger than those of west regions, such as Guizhou, Yunnan and Qinghai. 
In 1997, average years of schooling in Beijing is 8.04, and that in Shanghai and Tianjin are 
7.30 and 6.97 respectively. However, average years of schooling in Qinghai, Yunnan and 
Guizhou are 4.07, 5.01, and 5.20. Till 2008, average years of schooling in these three western 
regions have increased to 7.26, 6.90, and 7.05, which are still less than the level of Beijing 
and Shanghai in 1997.On the other hand, average years of schooling in the three 
municipalities have already increased to 10.97,10.55, and 9.88 in 2008. 
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Figure 2.1 Average years of schooling of 31 regions in 1997 and 2008 
 
Secondly, if we look at the structure of human capital, we can find that some regions have an 
extremely skewed distribution: most residents only have an education level of primary school 
or middle school; few residents have a college diploma. For example, in 2008, 40.47% of 
people who aged over six in Qinghai have only an education level of primary school, and 
people with higher education only accounts for 7.47% in the target population. On the 
contrary, some regions have a relatively more balanced distribution. Still take Beijing as an 
example. In 2008, the POC, POH, POM and POP of Beijing are 28.13%, 23.42%, 31.74% and 
13.39% respectively, which are not very different from each other. We pick up three regions, 
Beijing, Hubei (Which is in the central part of China) and Qinghai, and draw the graph based 
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on data in 2008. It is very clear that they have a quite different structure of human capital. 
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Figure 2.2 Different human capital structures in Beijing, Hubei and Qinghai, 2008 
 
Thirdly, regardless of the differences discussed above, the situation of human capital has 
improved during the 11 years, and this phenomenon can be observed both in the whole nation 
and in each single region. Average years of schooling increased. In 1997, the average years of 
schooling in the whole nation was 7.01, and then increased to 8.26 in 2008. Furthermore, each 
region also experienced an increase in average years of schooling during the 12 years, and 
Qinghai has the highest annual increasing rate which is 5.4%. We can take the average of each 
indicator in 31 regions, and see the fluctuation of them during the 11 years. And to make the 
interpretation easier, the indicators are scaled such that the average is zero, and divided by the 
corresponding standard error in that year. It can be obviously seen from the Figure 2.3 that 
illiteracy rate and people with their highest education level as primary school have declined, 
while the average of other indicators have increased. If we ignore the changes in population 
structure, these trends demonstrates that structure of human capital of the whole nation has 
improved.  
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Figure 2.3 Standardized averages of all the 6 indicators from 1997 to 2008 
 
And if we look at each single region, we will find that the structure has been upgraded in 
some regions, like Beijing and Shanghai, but for some regions, the process of upgrading goes 
very slowly. We can compare this process between Beijing and Sichuan during the 12 years 
through the following graphs. It turns out that the structure of human capital in Sichuan does 
not change much; however, the distribution of human capital in Beijing has graduately shifted 
to the left, which means a process of upgrading. 
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                Figure 2.4 the shift in human capital structure of Sichuan 
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Figure 2.5 The shift in human capital of Beijing 
2.3 Map the human capital in China: cluster analysis 
We have already had a rough picture of the geographic distribution of human capital in China. 
However, this first impression is still far from a full understanding. It is of our interests to 
know which regions are similar in terms of human capital, which differs a lot, and how. 
Furthermore, there is a common believe in China that human capital in west regions is very 
poor while the eastern regions did a good job in accumulating human capital. Since there are 
31 regions and 6 indicators, it is difficult to make a precise comparison among all 31 regions 
though the first look of the data, and it is also hard to exam whether the common believe is 
right. But those are the goal of this section, and to achieve it, we need to take advantage of 
some econometric tools. 
2.3.1 The Method 
As we discussed above, we need an econometric method which can help to make a 
comparison among the 31 regions and find the difference and similarity among them. Cluster 
analysis enables to meet our needs.  
Cluster analysis is a group of algorithms which researchers can use when they want to 
organize observations in a meaningful structure, that is, to develop taxonomies. According to 
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a certain distance measure and a certain linkage rule, cluster analysis puts observations in a 
way that the similarity of observation is maximal if they belong to the same type and minimal 
if otherwise. There are usually 5 ways of measuring distances: Euclidean distance, Squared 
Euclidean distance, Manhattan distance, Chebychev distance and Power distance. Among 
them, Euclidean distance is the most common way, which is simply the geometric distance. 
Besides the distance measures, each algorithm distinguish itself from the other by linkage rule. 
Distance measure is only used at the first step when each observation forms a cluster itself; 
linkage rule defines a way to measure the distance between two clusters which contain more 
than one observations. Also, there are several linkage rules: single linkage, complete linkage, 
unweighted pair-group average, weighted pair-group average, and Ward’s method etc.   
In this study, we choose Euclidean distance as the distance measures, and the formula is as 
following: 
2
1
( , ) ( )
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i i
i
d p q p q
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= −∑G G  
At the same time, we choose Ward’s method as linkage rule. This method takes clustering as a 
variance problem, which distinguishes itself from other method such as single linkage and 
complete linkage. This method attempts to minimize the error sum of squares (ESS) of any 
two hypothetical clusters that can be formed at each step. This method tends to have smaller 
size of clusters, but quite efficient (Wang, 2009). 
 
Xijk denote the value for variable k in observation j belonging to cluster i. 
 
In this section, we make use of the latest data, that is to say the data of 2008, and do the 
cluster analysis. We put all the 6 indicators: AYS, POC, POH, POM, POP，IC) as variables, 
and try to exam the association of them through Ward’s method. One thing worth mention 
here is that cluster analysis is more like an approach of data mining, thus unlike many other 
econometric methods, it does not have hypothesis and does not need statistical test. How 
many clusters one finally chooses depends on the knowledge related to the question on hand 
and the special needs of the study. 
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2.3.2 Results 
We use SAS 9.0 to accomplish the cluster analysis. The result can be summarized in the 
dendrogram, which we show below:  
 
Figure 2.6 The dendrogram with Ward’s method: the result of cluster analysis 
 
It can be seen from the dendrogram that 31 regions are categorized to several regions step by 
step, and at each step the number of clusters which has been formed decreases. At the last step, 
all regions fall into the same cluster. The X-axis represents the value of Semi-Partial R-Square, 
from which we can see the similarity of observations in the same cluster: bigger the 
Semi-Partial R-Square is, less similar they are.  
As we have mentioned before, how many numbers of clusters we finally get mainly depends 
on the purpose of research and relevant knowledge in that field. And our purpose here is to get 
a clear map of the geographic distribution of human capital in China. If we divided all the 
regions into too many clusters, it can not give a general picture; if we divide them into too 
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few clusters, we will lose some important information. For instance, if we categorize them 
into 3 clusters, it means that Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin are in the same cluster, and the 
rest 28 regions are pooled in another two clusters. In this case, we only know the three 
municipalities are in the top rank, and we can get few useful conclusions about the other two 
clusters since each of them includes too many regions to find a common thing in them. 
Therefore, we finally divide the 31 regions into 5 clusters, which are:  
Cluster I:  Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai; 
Cluster : Hubei, Shaanxi, Shandong, Hainan, Shanxi, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Jiangsu, Ⅱ
Jilin, Guangdong, Hunan, Henan, Hebei, Liaoning; 
Cluster : Zhejiang, Ningxia, Chongqing, Sichuan, FuⅢ jian, Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Anhui, 
Guangxi; 
Cluster : Qinghai, GuizhⅣ ou, Yunnan, Gansu; 
Cluster : TibetⅤ  
 
Furthermore, SAS also reports the statistical characteristics of each cluster, including mean, 
standard error, minimum value and maximum value. Table 2.3 summarizes these result 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  18
         Table 2.3 Summary of statistical characteristics of each cluster 
 
If we compare the 5 clusters based on the statistics above, we can find that the average years 
of schooling decreases from Cluster I to Cluster V: the average years of schooling in Cluster I 
is 10.46; and that in ClusterⅡ, Cluster  and Cluster   are 8.56, 7.97 and 7.09Ⅲ Ⅳ  
respectively; Cluster V, which includes Tibet solely, has a rather low level of average years of 
schooling, which is 4.71.  
The second finding is that there is a “shifting” in the structure of human capital from Cluster I 
to Cluster V. Comparing to other regiofinalns, a relatively larger percent of residents in 
regions of Cluster I hold a college diploma: on average, 22.08% of residents in regions of 
Cluster I Cluster Ⅱ 
Variable 
Number of 
regions Mean Std Min Max Variable
Number 
of regions
Mean Std Min Max
AYS 3 10.46 0.55 9.88 10.97 AYS 14 8.56 0.25 8.28 9.08
POC 3 22.08 6.35 15.46 28.12 POC 14 6.95 1.66 4.72 11.00
POH 3 24.41 0.88 23.42 25.07 POH 14 15.02 1.47 11.99 17.81
POM 3 34.26 2.60 31.74 36.94 POM 14 44.27 3.40 39.00 49.36
POP 3 15.31 2.76 13.39 18.48 POP 14 27.65 1.95 25.27 31.78
IC 3 3.53 0.43 3.11 3.97 IC 14 6.22 1.94 3.48 8.65
Cluster Ⅲ Cluster  Ⅳ 
Variable 
Number of 
regions Mean Std Min Max Variable
Number 
of regions
Mean Std Min Max
AYS 9 7.97 0.37 7.44 8.56 AYS 4 7.09 0.15 6.90 7.26
POC 9 6.12 2.40 3.29 9.70 POC 4 4.74 1.88 3.50 7.47
POH 9 11.82 1.62 10.05 14.90 POH 4 9.02 2.27 6.76 11.45
POM 9 38.11 3.30 34.41 45.27 POM 4 30.53 3.29 26.51 33.66
POP 9 35.67 2.84 32.44 40.51 POP 4 41.74 5.33 35.49 48.34
IC 9 8.79 3.02 4.64 14.49 IC 4 15.58 2.02 13.29 17.77
Cluster Ⅴ 
Variable 
Number of 
regions Mean Std Min Max
AYS 1 4.71 . 4.71 4.71
POC 1 1.72 . 1.72 1.72
POH 1 3.35 . 3.35 3.35
POM 1 13.21 . 13.21 13.21
POP 1 47.42 . 47.42 47.42
IC 1 37.77 . 37.77 37.77
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Cluster I have an college diploma, and this number is almost three times of that of ClusterⅡ, 
four times of that of Cluster , five times of that of Cluster , and twenty times of that of Ⅲ Ⅳ
Cluster V.  In regions of Cluster  and Cluster , Ⅱ Ⅲ the highest education level of most 
people (44.27%) is middle school, besides the average illiteracy rate in regions of Cluster  Ⅲ
is 8.79%, which is higher than that in regions of Cluster , which is 6.22%. MⅡ ost residents in 
Cluster  only attended pⅣ rimary school or middle school; fewer than 14% of residents in 
those regions have an education level above or equal to high school, and at the same time, 
illiteracy rate is 15.58%, which is relatively high. Tibet, the only region in Cluster , has aⅤ n 
extraordinary high illiteracy rate, which is 37.77%, and less than 19% of the residents have 
their highest education level above or equal to middle school.  
We can use different colors to illustrate the situation of human capital in a region, and the 
darker the color is, the better the situation of human capital is. By doing this, we finally get a 
map of geographic distribution of human capital in China1. 
 
Figure 2.7 The geographic distribution of human capital in China: based on the result of 
cluster analysis.  
 
As we see from a perspective of geography, Cluster I is consist of 3 municipalities; 
Cluster is basically composed of Northern regions, some coastal regions anⅡ d regions in the 
central part; Cluster  includes some western regions, some regions in the central part, and Ⅲ
                                                        
1 The three municipalities are too small to show in a different color, thus they are in the same color of regions in cluster Ⅱ. 
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two coastal regions (Zhejiang and Fujian); Cluster  is mainly consist ofⅣ  western regions; 
and Cluster  includes only Tibet. Ⅴ  
This result demonstrated that there is a pattern in the geographic distribution of human capital 
in China: western regions are mainly less developed than those in the east in terms of human 
capital; northern regions are more developed than the southern regions; and the abundant 
human capital in 3 municipalities makes other regions fall far behind.  
We have imposed two questions at the beginning of this section, and the last one is whether 
the common believe is right. By carefully examining the result of cluster analysis, we find 
that: although in general, economically poor regions are poor in human capital and 
economically developed regions have relatively abundant human capital, there are indeed 
some exceptions. Zhejiang and Fujian are both located along the southeast coast line, and are 
economically developed, but the average years of schooling in these two regions are even less 
than those in Shaanxi, Shanxi, which are two provinces located in northwest. If we look at the 
rank of per capita GDP in 2008, Zhejiang is in the fourth place, and Fujian is in the tenth place. However, 
Shanxi is ranked number 16, and Shaanxi is number 18.  
Actually, this is not a new finding. At the beginning of 21st century, some scholars in China 
has already observed that despite of the success in economic development, Zhejiang falls 
behind many regions in terms of human capital, and they named it as “Zhejiang Phenomenon”. 
Many scholars tried to explain the dilemma by reconsidering the relationship between human 
capital and economic growth and pointed out that at the beginning of transformation, the 
power of human capital is less obvious than that of infrastructures and etc. However, there 
may be other reasons. If we think about the data again, we will wonder whether this 
phenomenon really exists. Just like what many other Chinese researchers have done, we use 
the average years of schooling among people who aged over six. This group of people is not 
so closely related to production. It is the human capital in workforce which contributes to 
economic growth according to growth theories. And a low level of average years of schooling 
among people who aged over 6 does not necessarily mean a low level of that in workforce. 
The population structure, the number of students at school and other factors may affect the 
relationship of the two indicators. So we can not come to the conclusion that human capital 
contributes little to economic growth in China based on the data among people aged over six. 
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Even if this phenomenon really exists, there are some other possible reasons which may result 
in it. For example, culture difference may lead to different attitude in human capital 
investment. Residents in some regions of Zhejiang and Fujian value “business” more than 
education, but residents in northern part did the opposite thing. This has already gone beyond 
our study, but it provides the inspiration of panel data analysis in the following chapters. 
Table 2.4 Ranks in per capita GDP and average years of schooling of each region 
 
 
CLUSTER REGION 
PER CAPITA 
GDP(in10,000) 
RANK OF PER 
CAPITA GDP 
RANK OF AYS
Beijing 6.19 3 1 
Tianjin 6.28 2 3 Cluster I 
Shanghai 7.34 1 2 
Hubei 2.05 15 11 
Shaanxi 1.96 18 10 
Shandong 3.30 9 18 
Hainan 1.82 21 16 
Shanxi 2.05 16 6 
Heilongjiang 2.17 14 8 
Inner Mongolia 3.52 8 14 
Jiangsu 4.14 5 12 
Jilin 2.48 11 5 
Guangdong 3.74 6 7 
Hunan 1.81 22 13 
Henan 1.96 17 17 
Hebei 2.32 13 15 
ClusterⅡ 
Liaoning 3.72 7 4 
Zhejiang 4.37 4 20 
Ningxia 1.87 20 21 
Chongqing 2.34 12 24 
Sichuan 1.57 24 25 
Fujian 3.17 10 23 
Jiangxi 1.48 27 19 
Xinjiang 1.95 19 9 
Anhui 1.50 26 26 
ClusterⅢ 
Guangxi 1.54 25 22 
Qinghai 1.73 23 27 
Guizhou 0.88 31 29 
Yunnan 1.04 30 30 
ClusterⅣ 
Gansu 1.21 29 28 
Cluster VI Tibet 1.38 28 31 
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3 Do the regional differences increase?  
The cluster analysis described the regional difference based on one-year’s cross-sectional data, 
thus helped us to have a general view of the recent geographic distribution of human capital. 
But till now, we do not have any idea about how these differences have evolved with time. To 
answer this question, we need a new statistics to make good use of the 11-years data we have. 
3.1 The Method 
To understand the evolution of regional difference in human capital better, we need a statistics 
which enables us to evaluate regional difference of each indicator of each year. Then we can 
compare the regional differences among the 6 indicators and also from year to year. If we 
consider one indicator in a certain year, there are 31 observations which represent the relevant 
situation in the corresponding region. The regional difference in this indicator is actually the 
variation of this group of data. A bigger variation means larger regional difference. But by 
using variation, we can only make the comparison among the values of the same indicator 
during the 11 years. Which we can not do is the comparison among different indicators. To 
make this possible, we need a standardized statistics other than variation. That is to say, we 
need a statistics which could eliminate the difference in scale. Correlated variation just meets 
the requirement. Chen ,Zhao and Lu ,Ming adopted this method and computed the correlated 
variation of average years of schooling and other structure indicators, based on data from 
1987 to 2001(Chen et al., 2004). Here we will compute more recent values. Another 
difference from Chen’s study is that part of his data is estimated from a panel data model, but 
mine is all from the reports of SSB in China.  
The formula of correlated variation in this paper is as following: 
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kijx denotes the value of indication k in region j in year i; kiCV denotes the correlated 
variation of index k in year i ; n equals to 31. 
3.2 The results 
We calculate the correlated variation for each indicator during the 11 years, and report the 
result in the Figure 3.1.  
The correlated variation of Average years of schooling in 1997 is 0.14973, and it doesn’t 
change a lot with time. In 2008, this figure decreased very slightly to 0.13481, and the 
average during the 11 year is 0.148468. We can also see from Figure 3.1 that the regional 
difference of average years of schooling keeps at a very stable level during the 11 years. On 
one hand, this reflects the fact that the regional difference of human capital stock is not very 
big and doesn’t change a lot within time. On the other hand, it may also attribute to the other 
reason which is related to the way of measuring human capital stock: AYS is an indicator with 
the characteristic of the “Mean” statistics, thus it disregards the structure difference.  
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          Figure 3.1 Correlated variations of each indicator during 1997-2008 
 
Like average years of schooling, “percentage of middle school” (POM) and “percentage of 
primary school” (POP) also does not fluctuate greatly. In 1997, the correlated variation of 
POM is 0.2285, which is a little higher than that of AYS. In most years, it keeps going down, 
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and decreased to 0.1942 in 2008. The average is 0.2095 during the 11 years. At the same time, 
although the regional difference of POP in 1997 is smaller than that of POM, it increased 
graduately: the correlated variation in 1997 is 0.1846, but till 2008, it increased to 0. 2637. 
And the average is 0.2192 during the 11 years.  
Correlated variation of POH in 1997 is 0.4357, which is quite higher than that of POM, POP 
and AYS. It experienced a relatively great decrease in 2000 and then kept at a very stable level 
till 2008. In 2008, the figure is 0.3384 and the average is 0.3718. 
The rest two indicators, POC and IC carry the biggest regional difference. Besides, the 
correlated variations of them both fluctuate greatly during the 11 years. The correlated 
variation of POC is 0.7961 in 1997, and reached its maximum in 1999, which is 0.9101. In 
2008, it declined to 0.7075, which still represents a big regional difference.  
The correlated variation of illiteracy rate is 0.5692 in 1997, and although it goes up and down, 
finally it increased to 0.7464 in 2008, even higher than that of POC in the same year. This is a 
little bit unusual since China has started the campaign of “eliminating illiteracy” for a long 
time, and also implemented the “Nine-year Compulsory Education” system in 1986, so 
illiteracy rate in the new generation is supposed to be quite low. Therefore, we recheck the 
data and find that Tibet has an extremely high illiteracy rate which may affect our result. Then 
we do the computation again without considering Tibet, and find that this change has little 
influence on correlated variations of the other 5 indicators, but do make correlated variation of 
illiteracy rate decrease a lot. On the other hand, this new way of calculation does not change 
the increasing trend of it. 
Table 3.1 Comparison between correlated variation of illiteracy rate with and without Tibet 
 
Now we can make some summaries here. The human capital stock measured in average years 
of schooling does not differ much from region to region. Nevertheless, the human capital 
structure differs somehow. The percentage of people with higher education is very different 
among 31 regions, so do the illiteracy rate. And for POC, the regional difference decreased in 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
CV of IC with Tibet 0.57 0.62 0.66 0.75 0.61 0.76 0.67 0.66 0.75 0.72 0.75 
CV of IC without Tibet 0.46 0.48 0.41 0.51 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.51 0.55 0.51 
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the 11 years, while for IC, it increased. POH also exhibits some degree of regional difference 
and the other indicators are generally stable and do not exhibit great regional differences. 
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4 Analysis of the determinants of the unequal distribution 
As we discussed in the previous chapters, regional differences in human capital did exists in 
China during 1997-2008. Indeed, because of the economic transformation staring in 1980s, 
China exhibits unequal geographic distribution in many aspects. What discussed most is the 
income gap. However, when it comes to the unequal distribution of human capital, researches 
either focus on the description of the geographic distribution, or the relationship between 
human capital and economic growth. Few studies have tried to uncover the veil of the unequal 
distribution and see what the underlying reasons are. Yang Yang finds that per capita GDP, the 
education expenditure of centre government and the education expenditure of local 
governments are the main reasons leading to regional differences of human capital. He used 
the principal component analysis, which is based on the cross-sectional data in 2008. (Yang, 
2009) 
Previous analysis and discussions in this paper suggest a mild regional difference in average 
years of schooling, but a great regional difference in POC. In fact, the unequal distribution of 
people with higher education is intensively discussed in China and also in other countries, 
especially the migration of this group of people. In 1974, Bhagwati states that opening-up to 
migration will lead to “brain drain” in developing countries and harm their economic growth 
(Bhagwati, 1974). However, Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz proved that under certain 
conditions, the opening-up could have a “brain gain” effect (Stark et.al, 1998). Discussions as 
such are all about the international talent migration, not the migration within one country. At 
the same time, although Chinese scholars have noticed the internal talent migration for a long 
time, there are not many empirical studies, neither do theoretical models.   
Thus, in this chapter, we will make good use of the data on hand, and try to find the 
determinants of the unequal distribution of average years of schooling, as well as the 
percentage of people with higher education (POC). In the final section of this chapter, we will 
give a brief discuss of the validity of the estimation. And a theoretical model of internal 
migration will be derived in the next chapter. 
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4.1 What determines geographic distribution of human capital stock? 
4.1.1 The method 
Here we want to find what the key determinants of geographic distribution of human capital 
are. And the dependent variable will be average years of schooling of each region in each year. 
Because we have data of 31 regions, from 1997 to 2008(except 2001), it is very nature to 
think about the panel data regression. What is more, the advantages of panel data regression 
enable to reduce the omitted variable bias to a limited level in our study. 
Panel data regression is good at controlling two types of omitted variable bias: one is the bias 
caused by the omitted variables which vary from entity to entity, but do not change with time; 
the other is the bias caused by those which are constant across entities but evolve over time. 
In our study, there do exist some factors which may affect the average years of schooling, and 
also POC, and which are hard to measure and then not possible to be put into the econometric 
model. For example, people’s attitude towards education has changed during the 11 years, and 
taking education has been accepted graduately by more and more people. This change has the 
same influence on all regions across the country, and is supposed to increase the average years 
of schooling and POC. This belongs to “time fixed effect”. Meanwhile, due to different 
historical reasons, different regions may value education differently, which is called the 
“entity fixed effects” .Take Fujian province and Liaoning province as examples. Fujian has a 
history of going aboard for small business, and most of the first –generation-migrants who 
smuggled themselves abroad came from Fujian. So taking education is not a very important 
thing in their point of view. While in Liaoning province, and most other northern regions of 
China, parents value children’s education a lot, and this consequently leads to a higher human 
capital stock. Other factors which may affect the average years of schooling and POC are the 
location and nature environment of a region. Northern part of China is extremely cold and the 
air has been heavily polluted due to the long-period development of heavy industrial base. It 
should have a negative effect on human capital stock. This is only one case of how regions’ 
special climate and nature environment influent its accumulation of human capital. In a word, 
it is usually difficult to measure such factors, and omitting these variables could lead to bias in 
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corresponding estimators. However, the fixed effect model of panel data provides a possible 
approach to eliminate the bias resulted from the impossibility of measuring.  
Therefore, the econometric model can be written as following: 
it it i t itAYS X uβ α λ= + + +i                (4.1) 
1 2 1 2β and X are two vectors: ( , ,... ) is the vector of independent variables; ( , ... ) 
is the vector of coefficients corresponding to different independent variables.  is the entity
(region)
n n
i
X x x x β β β β
α
= =
it
 fixed effects, and  is the time fixed effect. Where i denotes region i, and t denotes 
year t.  is the residual.
tλ
μ
According to Greene, for a single variable x, the estimator is unbiased and consistent when 
the following assumptions are met (Greene, 2008): 
1. 0( | , , )it it i t it i tE ASY x xα λ β β α λ= + + +i ; 
2. No perfect multicollinearity; 
3.  ( | , , ) 0;it i tVar E it xμ α λ =  
4.
2 ,when i=s
0      otherwise( , ) {
I
it stCov u σμ =  
5. ( , ) 0 where it idCov u t dμ = ∀ ≠  
6. 2(0, )N Iμ σ∼  
The first assumption is the linearity assumption, which assumes that the relationship between 
x and y is linear. The third assumption says that the regressors are exogenous, and if this 
assumption is violated, the estimator is biased. The fourth assumption states that variance with 
the same region in the same year is constant, otherwise is zero. The fifth one is about the 
autocorrelation, and it assumes that there is no correlation in error terms across different years 
even within the same region. Among the six assumptions, the violation of assumption 3 often 
arises in multiple regressions, due to the omitted variable problem. As a result, we will pay 
special attention to it when selecting proper independent variables. 
4.1.2 The Variables 
Now we have figured out the proper approach to find out the determinants of average years of 
schooling, it is the time to discuss what the possible determinants are, in another words, what 
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the independent variables should be in this regression. And Generally speaking, we will base 
our selection of regressors on the study of two fields: human capital investment theories and 
brain drain theories, and to see whether those variables emphasized in theoretical models 
work in the same way in China.  
Because whether to take education is a decision of investment according to many scholars in 
this field, the elements which have an influence on individual’s decision may also affect 
average years of schooling in a region. The underlying logic is that human capital stock 
results from all its residents’ decision of education investment: if more people choose to take 
education or to increase their education level, the average years of schooling in a region must 
rise up. At the same time, educated people could choose freely where to work, thus the 
elements which are evolved in the migration decision can also affect the human capital stock 
in a region. When a region enables to attract more educated people, the human capital stock in 
this region must increase. On the other hand, even if a region has an abundant resource of 
students, but fails in the competition for talents in job markets, it may finally turn out to be 
poor in terms of human capital stock. 
Income is the first regressor coming into mind. Becker, one of the founders of human capital 
theory pointed out in his famous paper in 1964 that increasing the rate of return in education 
works as an incentive of investing in education. And the rate of return in education is 
positively related to the net earning, which is determined to a large extent by the income 
(Becker, 1964). Besides, according to Harris-Todaro migration theory, it is the expected 
income that influences the potential migrants’ decision (Ray, 1998). In many recent brain 
drain studies, like Miyagiwa’s study of scale economy in education and brain 
drain( Miyagiwa, 1991), Vidal’s study of the spillover effect of emigration on human capital 
formation(Vidal,1998), expected income plays a fundamental role in people’s migration 
decision, which then affects the human capital accumulation in a certain region. Therefore, we 
include income as one of the regressors in our model with the hypothesis that regions with 
higher income are richer in terms of human capital stock. To be more specific, we take the 
average disposable income of urban citizens in a region as one regressor. 
The unemployment rate is a major determinant of people’s real cost associated with 
investment of education, and plays a role in people’s education decision (Blöndal et al., 2002). 
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A higher employment rate of educated people could encourage people to take education, and 
as a result, could cause an increase in human capital stock. Besides, the probability of 
successful migration can lead to a “brain drain” or a “brain gain”, depending on how big the 
probability is (Chen, 2008). In our scenario, we argue that the probability of successful 
migration is positively related to the employment rate in the destination region .Because in 
modern China, there are few obstacles in internal migration, and it can be seen as a free 
choice. In order to settle down in a certain region, the only thing one needs to do is finding a 
job there to survive. Therefore, we will include unemployment rate as an independent variable 
in the regression. In fact, unemployment rate among educated people is a better indicator, but 
the data is only available in years when there is a national census.  
Cost is the other variable worth while considering from the perspective of human capital 
investment and migration. Cost in a general sense affects the human capital stock of a certain 
region through two mechanisms. The first mechanism is through tuition and fees, which is the 
individual’s private cost of taking education. And keeping other factors constant, like earnings, 
public financial support, a higher tuition and miscellaneous fees work as disincentives of 
taking education, thus it should be negatively related to human capital stock. However, in 
practical, the data of education cost is not available for all regions. As a result, we are not able 
to include it in our model. The validity problem caused by this exclusion will be discussed at 
the end of this chapter. The second mechanism is through living cost, which influences the 
accumulation of human capital stock in a region by affecting people’s migration decision. 
Although living cost is seldom integrated into either the human capital investment models or 
the migration models, it doesn’t mean living cost do not affect the human capital stock of a 
region at all. High living expenditure in big cities in China has caused some graduates return 
back home, which increases the human capital in small cities and decreases that in big cities. 
Thus we use the average annual consumptional expenditure of urban citizens in each region to 
indicate the living cost, and add it into the regression model. 
Besides income and cost which are usually evolved in people’s cost-benefits analysis of 
education, there are other nonpecuniary benefits which are also under people’s consideration. 
Wilson developed a structural model in which utility-maximizing individuals choose their 
education level in response to economic return of education as well as neighborhood 
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characteristics. According to Wilson, neighborhood characteristics include location, the 
composition of residents, and economic status (Wilson, 2001). If we take the possibility of 
migration into account, those characteristics also influence individual’s choice of migration 
destination. According to the Push-pull Theory, the early migration theory, convenient life and 
good medical treatment system are all examples of pull factors. Thus, we include 3 
independent variables to reflect the neighborhood characteristics, or in other words, 
nonpecuniary benefits: the ratio of urban residents to rural residents; the number of street 
lights per each city; and the number of health personnel per 10, 000 inhabitants. The first 
variable is closely related to the urbanization process in a certain region. More urban residents 
mean a more open culture, but also a more crowding living environment in cities. While the 
first effect may provide incentive for taking education and attract more educated people, the 
second effect may drive educated people out of the region. Therefore, the impact of this 
variable on the dependent variable may go to either direction. The number of street lights per 
cities is usually is an indicator of development, and is considered able to reflect the 
development of infrastructure in a region What is more, it plays an important role in adding 
beauty to a region at night, and also affects people’s perception about the security situation in 
that region. On one hand, in areas with more street lights, fewer crimes will happen; on the 
other hand, more street lights could help drivers to have a better view and then lead to a 
reduction in the number of car accidents. Based on these reasons, people may prefer being 
educated and living in a region with more street lights. Thus, number of street lights per cities 
is assumed to be positively related to both average years of schooling and POC. Health 
personnel in China include 3 types of people: certified doctors, assistant doctors, and 
registered nurses. This last variable represents the level of medical treatment in a region, 
which plays an important role in individual’s migration decision: people always want to have 
better access to medical treatment. Thus, this regressor is assumed to positively related to the 
two dependent variables.  
Government’s education expenditure is anther variable which is often discussed by Chinese 
scholars when it comes to the study of human capital. In some researches, it is selected as an 
indicator of human capital (Lu et.al, 2010); and in some researchers, government’s education 
expenditure is considered be able to evaluate a region’s ability of cultivating talents, and as a 
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result, has significant influence on human capital accumulation of a region (Gu, 2006). In fact, 
governments’ expenditure, or subsidy on education is anther source of human capital 
investment besides private investment, and it has crucial impact on human capital stock 
through improving school quality, according to Wilson’s study based on American data 
(Wilson, 2001), and at the same time, it is considered to be able to encourage people attending 
school in China, especially those in rural areas who are not able to afford education alone 
(Heckman, 2004). The discussions above have offered solid theoretical foundation for us to 
include government’s education expenditure in the regression. To avoid being disturbing by 
different population size, we finally take the government’s education expenditure per person 
as a regressor.  
Based on the discussion above, we can modify the regression model as following: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7                                        
_ _
_ _  ( 4.2)
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AYS income unem rate cost rur streetlight per hp
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Although we have selected 7 independent variables, it does not mean omitted variable bias 
does not exist in this regression .As long as there are omitted variables which are correlated 
with the included regressors and at the same time are a determinant of the dependent variable, 
omitted variable bias will arise (Stock and Watson, 2007). Thus, it is worth thinking twice 
before we proceed further with the data. 
We should first notice that since there are already 7 variables, each of them may be biased due 
to the violation of assumption 3. However, we should also notice that the regressor itself not 
only be a potential determinant, but also can be a control variable for other regressors. For 
example, income is positively related with the number of street lights per cities, because 
usually an economically developed region has more street lights and its residents have a 
higher level of average income. The similar relationship can be also found between the 
number of street lights per cities and the number of health personnel per 10,000 inhabitants, 
because they are both positively dependent on how developed a region is. As a result, the 
combination of such variables enables to reduce the omitted variable bias. Then, the next 
question is, are there any omitted variables which are not included in our framework and thus 
not added in model (4.2)? 
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The first possible variable coming into mind is the number of students. It is obvious that 
number of students has an important effect on average years of schooling: holding other 
things equal, a higher number of students leads to a higher level of average years of schooling. 
Meanwhile, number of students is associated with income, which represents the economical 
status of a region. That is, in regions where people are richer, people’s education decisions are 
not limited by the budget constrain, and as a result more people could go to school. Based on 
the discussions above, we need to add number of students into the model. To eliminating the 
effect of population size, we finally add the student ratio in the whole population into the 
model: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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_ _ _    (4.3)
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Nevertheless, (4.3) is still not the final model we will use, because there are anther variable 
which we have neglected. The average years of schooling in our study is based on the 
population aged over six, so if many people are in the school age and fewer people are the 
labor force, the average years of schooling may be smaller. In other words, population 
structure will influence the level of human capital stock. Furthermore, population structure is 
also correlated with the student ratio, and also the average annual income as well as 
expenditures, since different age groups have different earning abilities and consumptional 
habits. Consequently, if we do not include population structure as a regressor, the omitted bias 
problem will arise. To measure the population structure, we use the ratio of people over 15, 
and modify the model as:  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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Till now, we accomplished the econometric model we will use, and the independent variables 
are summarized in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of the independent variables in regression to  
average years of schooling 
 
4.1.3 Data Source 
In this section, we will give a brief introduction of the data which is going to be used in the 
regression. 
The main data source is the “China’s Statistical Yearbook” from 1998 to 2009. We can obtain 
“Average disposable income of urban residents”, “Average consumptional expenditure of 
urban residents” directly from the yearbook in the corresponding year. To compute “the 
number of street lights per city”, we use the data “number of street lights” in this yearbook, 
and divide it by “the number of cities”, which is also available in the yearbook. For some 
years, the yearbooks report “the number of health personnel per 10,000 inhabitants”, but for 
most years, they only report “the number of health personnel”, so we have to divide it by 
population provided by the same yearbook. To compute “Per capita government’s education 
expenditure”, we collected the data of “government’s education expenditure” from the 
yearbook, and divided it by population. “The China’s statistic yearbook” reports the number 
of students every year, and then we divide it by population to get the “student ratio”. “Ratio of 
people aged over 15” is simply based on the information of “Age Composition by Region” 
Variable Name Unit 
Average annual disposable income of 
urban residents 
income 10,000RMB 
Average annual consumptional 
expenditure of urban residents 
cost 10,000RMB 
Unemployment rate unem_rate % 
Population ratio of urban residents to 
rural residents 
rur % 
The number of street lights per city streetlight       one 
The number of health personnel per 
10,000 inhabitants 
per_hp person 
Government’s education expenditure 
per student 
per_e_education RMB/person 
Student ratio Student_ratio person 
Ratio of people aged over 15 rp % 
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provided by the yearbook. 
The other two variables, “Unemployment rate” and “Population ratio of urban residents to 
rural residents” are from different sources. “Unemployment rate” is “the registered 
unemployment rate in urban areas”, which is found at “China Labor Statistic Yearbook”; and 
“Population ratio of urban residents to rural residents” is from “The Information Website of 
Development Research Center of the State Council”. 
4.1.4 The results 
We use the statistical software SAS.9.0 to implement the regression. In practical, we use 10 
regional binary indicators and 30 time binary indicators to represent the entity fixed effects 
and time fixed effects, respectively. 
The estimated values of coefficients in equation are summarized in table 4.2. The dependent 
variable is average years of schooling. In the first column, we use the multiple regression 
model, which does not include entity fixed effect indicators as well as time fixed effect 
indicators. The regression equation of this the model is vey similar to (4.2), but without αi and 
λt. Results of equation (4.2) are summarized in column 2, and we use the fix effects model, 
adding both entity fixed effect indicators and time fixed effect indicators. In column 3, we 
added “student ratio” to control for the omitted variable bias, and the corresponding 
regression model is (4.3). The last column represents the results of equation (4.4), in which 
we add “population ratio of people aged over 15” to control the omitted variable bias. The 
degree of freedom for this model is 49 since we have 40 binary variables, 7 explanatory 
variables and 2 control variables. 
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Table 4.2 The panel data regression analysis of determinants of average years of schooling 
Dependent variable: 
average years of schooling (years per person) 
Regressor ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ 
income -0.038 (0.056) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.082** 
(0.019) 
cost 1.572** (0.237) 
-0.71** 
(0.23) 
-0.71** 
(0.23) 
-0.901*** 
(0.215) 
unem_rate -0.083 (0.054) 
0.012 
(0.023) 
0.012 
(0.023) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
rur 0.056** (0.007) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
streetlight -0.000001 (0.000001) 
0.000003** 
(<0.000001) 
0.000003** 
(<0.000001) 
0.000004** 
(<0.000001) 
per_hp -0.009 (0.007) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.0099** 
(0.004) 
per_e_education 0.000006 (0.00005) 
0.00006* 
(0.00003) 
0.00006* 
(0.00003) 
0.00007** 
(0.00002) 
Student_ratio 0.013 (0.017) 
---- 0.001 
(0.011) 
0.026* 
(0.012) 
rp ---- ---- ---- 0.083** (0.012) 
entity effects? no yes yes yes 
time effects？ no yes yes yes 
observations 331 331 331 331 
Adjusted-R2 0.6066 0.9721 0.9720 0.9758 
The data used include 31 regions, from 1997 to 2008 and except 2001. The region and time fixed effects 
are included in (2), (3) and (4), but not reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses under the 
coefficients. The individual coefficient are statistically significant at the *5%level, or **1%level.  
 
Comparing the results in column2 with that in column 1, we find that firstly the Adjusted-R2 
has increased from 0.61 to 0.97. And the coefficients which are statistically significant in the 
two specifications are different. In specification (1), only cost and the population ratio of 
urban residents to rural residents are statistically significant. However, in specification (2), 
income, cost, the number of street lights per cities and government’s education expenditure 
per capita are all statistically significant. Furthermore, the signs before the coefficients of the 
first three variables have changed, comparing to specification (1). Although the result of 
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Specification (3) does not differ much from that of the specification (2), the combination of 
student ratio and population ratio of people who aged over 15 does improved the model, as 
column (4) shows. The coefficient of the added variable is statistically significant; the 
coefficients of the number of health personnel per 10,000 inhabitants and student ratio 
become statistically significant after the modification; Adjusted-R2 increased. Thus, regression 
(4.4) is the most reliable regression and we will focus on it in the following discussion1. And 
we will discuss the validity of this regression later. 
Income has a positive effect on the average years of schooling, holding other variables 
constant. To be more specific, controlling for other variables, the average years of schooling 
will increase by 0.082 years if the average annual disposable income of urban residents 
increases by 10,000RMB. This effect is not as great as that of the cost. A decrease in the 
average annual consumptional expenditure by 10,000RMB could lead to a rise of average 
years of schooling by 0.901. Thus, the income difference between two regions could cause the 
difference of human capital stock, so does the cost difference. Furthermore, the regional cost 
difference has a greater effect on the regional difference of human capital stock. 
The number of street lights per cities, number of health personnel per 10,000 inhabitants, and 
the population ratio of urban residents to rural residents are the three indicators we selected to 
represent nonpecuniary benefits, or the neighborhood characteristics. The coefficients before 
the first two variables are both statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the third one 
does not have statistically significant association on average years of schooling in our model, 
even at a 10% significance level. Holding others constant, a region owning 10,000 more street 
lights per cities tends to be 0.04 years higher in average years of schooling. And a region 
where every 10,000 inhabitants owned 10 more health personnel tends to be 0.09 years higher 
in average years of schooling.  
The result in our study supports other Chinese scholars’ conclusion that government’s 
education expenditure has an influence on the human capital stock in that region (Gu, 2006; 
Yang, 2009). Controlling for other variables, a local government which spends 10,000RMB 
more in education for each of its resident, gains a level of average years of schooling which is 
                                                        
1 We actually also did the log-linear regression afterwards, however, the result of specification (4.4) is still preferred since it 
meets our gut feeling better. 
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0.7 years higher than that of other regions. Nevertheless, this effect is smaller comparing to 
that of decreasing cost but bigger than that of increasing income. 
To our surprise, unemployment rate is not statistically significant even at a 10% significance 
level. Based on our previous discussion, other factors are given, if the probability of finding a 
job in certain region is bigger than other regions, it will attract more educated people. The 
surprising result here may be because we have used the registered unemployment rate of all 
people rather than the unemployment rate among educated people. Another possible reason is 
difference in the situation of job markets really does not affect people’s education decision 
and migration decision, due to the asymmetric information or lack of sensitivity. That is to say, 
people do not have full information about the true situation of job market, or even they have, 
their responses to it are slow and slight.  
The student ratio also has a statistically significant effect on average years of schooling at a 
5% significance level, although it is not the variable which we want to exam through 
empirical study. A 1% increase in student ratio render the average years of schooling to 
increase by 0.026 years, holding other variables constant.  
One thing worth mentioning here is that the coefficient of student ratio is not statistically 
significant before we add the second control variable. Thus the second indicator helps us to 
decrease the omitted variable bias. And the indicator itself also has a statistically significant 
effect on average years of schooling. Just as we have discussed, if this indicator is very small, 
a population is too young to have a high level of human capital stock. Our results suggest that 
a 1% increase in this indicator leads to a 0.083 years increase in the average years of 
schooling. Of course, we are not very interested in the effect of the population structure on 
human capital stock, comparing to the effects of other indicators, and we select this indicator 
only on the purpose of controlling omitted variable bias. 
To conclude, most indicators we selected are estimated to have the same influence on the 
geographic distribution of human capital stock as theories suggested or are the same with 
other empirical studies. At the same time, some are not, for example, the unemployment rate. 
In the next section, we will discuss another variable, the percentage of people with higher 
education, which exhibits the biggest regional difference, and to see what the determinants are 
and also compare the results with what we have found in this section. 
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4.2 What determines geographic distribution of talents? 
We define talents as people with higher education, and it is worth while discussing the 
geographic distribution of talents in a separate section because of two reasons. Firstly, we 
have shown that, the correlated variation of POC is the highest among the 6 indicators 
through the 11 years, and the average is around 0.75. Those facts suggest a big regional 
difference in talent stock. Secondly, some scholars have argued that a key reason resulting in 
this unequal distribution is the migration of talents. Yang argued that in regions located at the 
central part or the western part, like Anhui, Henan, Sichuan, Guizhou and Gansu, the fruits of 
high education have been “eaten up” by the migration for jobs (Yang, 2009). Since migration 
of people with higher education is relatively easier and thus more frequent than people with a 
lower level of education, the mechanism which leads to the geographic distribution of talents 
is more complicated. Therefore, we will continue our econometric analysis in this section, as 
what we have done to the average years of schooling.  
4.2.1 The methods and variables 
The econometric methods and the framework on which the selection of variables is based are 
similar to the analysis of average years of schooling. We will use the entity and time fixed 
effect model to implement the estimation, with a panel data which include 31 regions and 
11years (from 1997 to 2008 and except 2001). The dependent variable is the percentage of 
people with a college diploma or above, i.e. POC. The basic model can be written as: 
                              ( 4.4)it it i t itPOC X uβ α λ′ ′ ′ ′= + + +i  
it
Where  is a vector of coefficents and  is a vector of regressors.  is the entity
 effects and  is the time effects.  is the residual.  denotes region  and  denotes 
year .
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Except for some small adjustments, the variables we select here are as the same as what we 
added in the model (4.3). Average annual disposable income of urban residents, average 
annual consumptional expenditure of urban residents, unemployment rate and the three 
nonpecuniary indicators (population ratio of urban residents to rural residents; the number of 
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street lights per city; the number of health personnel per 10,000 inhabitants) are kept as 
independent variables of POC. 
Nevertheless, instead of government’s education expenditure per capita, here we take 
government’s expenditure of high education per college students as the independent variable, 
which is more closely related on the dependent variable.  
The specification of our model can be expressed as following: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7                                                                                         
_ _
_ _
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And to control the omitted variable bias, we add the college student ratio of the whole 
population in the model, which is similar to the approach we used in the regression against 
average years of schooling. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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Furthermore, we add population ratio of people who aged over 15 to control for additional 
omitted variable bias, and the mechanism is the same as we discussed in 4.1.2.Based on 
discussions above, we write the final model of POC as following: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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        Table 4.3 Summary of independent variables in regression to POC 
Variable Name Unit 
Average annual disposable income of 
urban residents 
income 10,000RMB 
Average annual consumptional 
expenditure of urban residents 
cost 10,000RMB 
Unemployment rate unem_rate % 
Population ratio of urban residents to 
rural residents 
rur % 
The number of street lights per city streetlight one 
The number of health personnel per 
10,000 inhabitants 
per_hp person 
Government’s expenditure of high 
education per college student 
per_e_education 10,000RMB 
Ratio of college students ncstudentratio % 
Ratio of people aged over 15 rp % 
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Variables in light gray are those which slightly differ from Table 4.1. 
4.2.2 Data Source 
The data source of the first six variables has been introduced in section 4.1.3. Here we only 
illustrate the data source of the other two variables.  
Government’s expenditure of high education per college students is from the “China 
Educational Finance Statistical Yearbook”, however, it dose not state how it is computed. 
And the number of college students is the “Number of students in Undergraduate or 
Specialized Courses in Institutions of Higher Education”. Thus, postgraduates and various 
doctors are not included in the calculation. 
4.2.3 The Results 
Again, four regressions are implemented and the results are summarized in Table 4.4. The 
first column gives the result of the regression similar to (4.5), but without the entity and time 
fixed effects. Then we added 30 indicators of entity and 10 indicators of year, and the result 
is in column 2. Adjusted-R2 has improved, from 0.85 to 0.95 after the adjustment in 
regression model and average annual consumptional expenditure becomes statistically 
insignificant. Although a further modification according to (4.6) does not improve the 
Adjusted-R2 to a large extent, the result in column 3 suggests that college student ratio has a 
very big impact on POC. Furthermore, the coefficient of the government’s expenditure in 
higher education per college students, which is statistically significant in the first two 
regressions, is not statistically significant in specification (3). Finally, we add the population 
ratio of people aged over 15 according to model (4.7), and the result in column (4) shows 
that it does have a statistically significant impact on POC, and because of this modification, 
the coefficient of college student ratio becomes smaller, but the coefficient of income 
becomes bigger. To conclude, the last regression model is the most reliable one1, therefore, 
we will base our discussion on it. Similarly, the degree of freedom for the model is also 49.  
 
                                                        
1 Here we also did the log-linear regression, and again, the result does not meet our gut feeling well, thus we will continue 
with what we already had. 
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Table 4.4 The panel data regression analysis of determinants of POC 
Dependent variable: 
POC（%） 
Regressor ⑴ ⑵ ⑶ ⑷ 
income 
0.551** 
(0.125) 
0.931** 
(0.095) 
0.832** 
(0.096) 
0.867** 
(0.096) 
cost 
4.723** 
(0.579) 
0.129 
(1.107) 
-0.274 
(1.083) 
-0.572 
(1.082) 
unem_rate 
0.173 
(0.118) 
-0.026 
(0.018) 
-0.114 
(0.108) 
-0.114 
(0.108) 
rur 
0.018 
(0.015) 
-0.01 
(0.026) 
-0.029 
(0.025) 
-0.044 
(0.025) 
streetlight 
0.00003** 
(0.000003) 
0.00005** 
(0.000004) 
0.00005** 
(0.000004) 
0.00005** 
(0.000004) 
per_hp 
0.117 
(0.015) 
0.041* 
(0.018) 
0.06** 
(0.02) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
per_he_education 
-1.048** 
(0.312) 
0.231* 
(0.369) 
0.323 
(0.360) 
0.327 
(0.357) 
cstudentratio ---- 
---- 1.423** 
(0.357) 
1.301** 
(0.358) 
rp ---- 
---- 
---- 
0.141* 
(0.059) 
entity effects? no yes yes yes 
time effects？ no yes yes yes 
observations 331 331 331 331 
Adjusted-R2 0.8483 0.9521 0.9545 0.9552 
The data used include 31 regions, from 1997 to 2008 and except 2001. The region and time fixed effects 
are included in (2), (3) and (4), but not reported. Standard errors are given in parentheses under the 
coefficients. The individual coefficient are statistically significant at the *5%level, or **1%level.  
 
There are five variables which have statistically significant effect on POC, and two of them 
are added to the model to control omitted variable bias. Average annual disposable income 
has a positive impact on POC: controlling for other variables: if the average annual 
disposable income increases by 10,000 RMB, the percentage of people holding a college 
diploma or above will increase by 0.867%. Therefore, regional income difference does not 
only lead to the regional difference of human capital stock, but also the regional difference 
of talent stock. 
  43
Two of the three nonpecuniary indictors are statistically significant, just as the situation in 
regression against average years of schooling. The coefficient of the number of street lights 
per city is 0.00005, which means that other things equal, the region which owns 10,000 more 
street lights per cities tends to be 0.5% higher in POC. The number of health personnel per 
10,000 inhabitants is also statistically significant at a 10% significance level, and the effect is 
relatively great. An increase of number of health personnel per 10,000 inhabitants by 10 will 
lead the POC to increase by 0.7%, holding other variables constant. Notice that these two 
indicators are also statistically significant in model (4.3), thus, like the effect of regional 
income difference, the regional differences in modernization as well as medical treatment 
can cause regional differences in both human capital stock and talent stock. 
Now it is of our interests to have a look at those indicators which have a statistically 
significant influence on average years of education, but not on POC. Average annual 
consumptional expenditure and government’s expenditure in education are two such 
indicators.  
As we discussed in 4.1.2, although few scholars has taken living cost into account when 
constructing structural model of brain drain, it may has an impact on talent stock of a region. 
However, the result in our study does not support our original hypothesis, and also seems 
deviating from the reality. Just as we mentioned before, the high expenditure in Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangdong has forced some employees return to their home towns, and this 
trend is intensively discussed in China as “escaping from big cities” these days. So what are 
the reasons behind the conflict between our result and the reality? Recall that annual average 
consumptional cost is a statistically significant indicator in the regression against average 
years of education. The average years of schooling as an indicator of human capital stock, 
results from the actions of people with various education backgrounds, but POC is only 
affected by the action of talents. Furthermore, although some people choose to leave big 
cities, most of them choose to stay. Therefore, it is reasonable to explain the phenomenon 
from a perspective of different behavior patterns among people. One possible reason is that 
for most people with a good education background, the high living cost in the short run does 
not matter much, and they emphasize more on the income stream in the coming future and 
the development in their career. And the result of this behavior pattern is that living cost is 
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statistically insignificant in the empirical study. 
Unemployment rate is not statistically significant, and we have given the possible 
explanation in 4.1.4, thus there is not necessary to repeat it again. 
Let’s turn our eyes upon government’s expenditure in higher education. Although the 
relationship between government’s expenditure and average years of schooling has been 
studied by many scholars, there are few papers about the relationship between government’s 
expenditure in higher education and the talent stock. Our study here suggests that there is not 
a statistically significant association between the two variables, and it is a surprising result to 
some extent. One possible reason is that:   government’s subsidy for primary school or 
middle school releases the budget constraints for some poor families and makes the 
corresponding education free. The direct consequence is more people can attend school and 
the average years of schooling increases. However, despite of the subsidy from government, 
tuitions and miscellaneous fees for higher education are still very high, so the effect of 
releasing budget constraint is not obvious and efficient here. Thus, government’s expenditure 
in higher education may only improve the quality of students, but does not increase the 
quantity.  
College student ratio has a very closely positive association with POC, which is not 
surprising. According to Table 4.4, a 1% increase in college student ratio could induce POC 
to increase by 1.3%. However, this relationship is more mathematical rather than having any 
economic meaning. So does the relationship between POC and population structure. On the 
other hand, studies of some scholars demonstrated that some regions having abundant 
number of college students suffer from a brain drain: the flowing-out of talents (Yang, 2009). 
We have already discussed the determinants of the geographic distribution of human capital 
stock as well as the talent stock. But stock is a static concept, and in fact, the formation of 
this static concept can be partly attributed to a dynamic concept: migration of educated 
people. In fact, we have had some brief discussion about it when selecting independent 
variables of the regression. Internal Migration of educated people is very important 
especially when we are talking about the regional difference of talent stock. So far we are not 
able to illustrate this process in China precisely and also not able to obtain some interesting 
results. Furthermore, we have not discussed the determinants of geographic distribution in 
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human capital in labor force. Since an empirical study is impossible due to the unavailability 
of data, a theoretical model is necessary and feasible. Therefore, in Chapter 5, we will try to 
construct an internal migration model, to complement our discussion about geographic 
distribution of human capital. But what comes in the next section, is an examination of the 
validity of our econometric study. 
4.3 Validity of the Estimation 
We have already found the key determinants for average years of schooling and the POC, 
respectively. And the results show that: income, cost, government’s education expenditure per 
student, the number of street lights per cities and the number of health personnel per 10,000 
inhabitants have statistically significant impact on average years of schooling in a region; 
income, the number of street lights per cities and the number of health personnel per 10,000 
inhabitants are statistically significant associated with POC. Although our major purpose is to 
figure out which are the main determinants, and we are not very interested in the magnitude 
of the impact, it is still worth to discuss about the validity of the econometric study, because 
some problems may cause such a serious bias that we may get the wrong answer to our main 
question. 
4.3.1 Omitted Variable Bias 
We have paid special attention to the omitted variable bias problem while selecting the proper 
regression model. Two things have been done to control for the omitted variable bias. The 
first thing is that we use a panel data regression, which includes entity and time fixed effects 
and thus enables us to control for some unobserved variables; the second thing is we added 
another two additional control variables: the student ratio(the college student ratio in 
regression against POC), and the population ratio of people who aged over 15. By doing these, 
omitted variable bias can be thought as well controlled and declined to a limited level. 
However, as we mentioned before, we do not have information of education cost, so it is 
impossible to include this in the two regressions.  If it is related with any existing 
independent variables, omitted variable bias will arise.  
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4.3.2 Simultaneous Causality 
Regressions we did in the previous sections helped to find out the variables which have 
statistically significant association with human capital stock as well as talent stock. And till 
now, we assume that this “association” is the causality running from independent variables to 
dependent variables. In fact, it may be the case that a change in dependent variable also 
causes the changes in independent variables. And we call it the “simultaneous causality”. And 
in such circumstances, the estimators provided by OLS regression are biased and inconsistent 
(Stock and Watson, 2007). It is time to have a second look at the independent variables we 
have selected, and see whether a possibility of simultaneous causality exists. Considering that 
student ratio (college student ratio in (4.7)) and population ratio of people aged over 15 are 
two control variables, which does not have economic implication, we will exclude them from 
the following discussion.  
A lower unemployment rate in certain region may enhance the incentive of taking education 
and migration, thus is supposed to increase human capital stock and talent stock in the 
corresponding region. At the same time, gathering of educated people may have two opposite 
effects on unemployment rate. On one hand, the abundant resource of educated people can 
contribute to the economic growth in the region, and more jobs are created, which pull down 
the unemployment rate. On the other hand, job competition could be fiercer comparing to the 
regions which own fewer educated people, and as a result, the unemployment rate tends to 
rise up. Regardless of which effect dominants, the existence of simultaneous causality causes 
unemployment rate to be correlated with the error term, and consequently, the estimator is 
biased and inconsistent.   
Simultaneous causality may also arise between the number of health personnel per 10,000 
inhabitants and human capital stock as well as talent stock. Because health personnel must 
meet certain criterion, it is possible that a larger number of educated people, especially a 
larger number of people with higher education, could lead to a lager number of health 
personnel per 10,000 inhabitants. Similarly, in this case, a simultaneous causality bias arises 
and the estimator is inconsistent. 
One way to solve the problems addressed above is using the instrumental variables regression. 
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We will not continue the study here, but a further discussion and modification of our study is 
appreciated.  
4.3.3 Errors-in-variables 
Errors–in-variables bias arises when an independent variable is not measured precisely. And 
there are several sources of this type of bias. The data we used are from surveys in the 
corresponding year, and except for 2000, surveys in the other years are sample survey. 
Furthermore, the way of selecting the sample has changed from 1997 to 2008. For example, 
the information about income and cost are from the “Sample Survey on Urban Household”. 
And before 2002, the objects of urban household are non-farm household, which is 
determined by “Hukou”, but after 2002, they are changed to households in the district areas of 
all city and county towns. Thus, there may be errors-in-variables due to the change of 
sampling, and also due to responders’ imprecise answer to questions. The other possible 
source is that registered unemployment rate is an inaccurate measure of the situation in job 
market for educated people. As we discussed before, unemployment of educated people is a 
better indicator in (4.4), and unemployment of people with higher education background is a 
better indicator in (4.7). However, the data is not available in most years. 
Through the discussion above, we know that errors-in-variables may exist in our study, 
however, to a large extent it is due to the limitation of data availability, which is hard to 
improve in a short time. Once again, modification and improvement of our study is 
appreciated, but we will go no further in this paper. 
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5 A model of internal migration  
5.1 Background 
We have studied the determinants of geographic distribution of human capital stock in the 
whole population. However, due to the unavailability of data, we are not able to examine the 
elements which affect the geographic distribution of human capital in labor force1. As we 
have discussed, migration of educated people or talents, is a dynamic process, and which 
could affect the formation of human capital stock in the whole population, especially that in 
the labor force. Because the number of educated labor force in a region can be considered 
solely being determined after the two migration processes. Thus, if we can construct a 
theoretical model to explain the mechanism behind the internal migration, it will complement 
our study in the geographic distribution of human capital in labor force, and also will help us 
to understand the internal migration better. 
Previous papers and publications study the international migration of educated people from 
the perspective of “brain drain”. If a large number of skilled people have migrated to foreign 
countries, the source country is considered experiencing a “brain drain”. By saying brain 
drain, scholars mean loss of educated labor force. Brain drain is usually regarded as an 
economic cost: on one hand, the source country loses many skilled people, who are able to 
contribute to the economic growth in the source country according to the endogenous growth 
theory; secondly, there is also out-flow of government’s subsidy in education with the out-low 
of skilled people. Earlier researches in brain drain found that the immigration of skilled 
people has negative implications in the source countries’ welfare (Bhagwati, 1974). And 
besides losing number of people, source country also loses human capital in immigration 
(Katz et.al, 1987). However, in 1990s, scholars became focus on anther possible result 
brought by immigration of skilled people, and the problem of international migration has been 
discussed intensively during this period. Under a model of scale economy, it is demonstrated 
that it is those professionals possessing intermediate-level abilities who are hurt by brain drain, 
                                                        
1 We do not have information about the education attainment in people aged over 15, thus it is impossible to calculate the 
average years of schooling and POC. 
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but at the same time, brain drain could raise the education and income levels of a host country 
(Miyagiwa, 1991). If migration is not a certainty, a brain drain may increase average 
productivity and equality in the source economy (Mountford, 1997). And the level of human 
capital formation in the source country can be positively correlated with the probability of 
emigration; an incidentally surge in emigration can lead the source country out of an 
under-development trap (Vidal, 1998). The condition under which a strictly positive 
probability of employment in a foreign country raises the level of human capital of the source 
country has been specified (Stark et al., 1998). It is also demonstrated that under some 
conditions, a “brain effects” will dominant “the drain effect” (Beine, 2001). In these papers, 
the probability of migration is assumed exogenous in the context of international migration, 
because there is a visa control in foreign countries. Attempts to endogenize it have been made. 
And it is found that if probability of migration based upon the “threshold effects” of average 
human capital, and if households perceive that there is a high probability of migration in the 
future, they will invest more in their education, thereby increasing the accumulation of human 
capital, which will in turn induce a higher probability of migration (Chen, 2008). 
The migration trend of educated people among countries can be also observed within a 
country. It is shows that some provinces experienced a gain in human beings but a net loss in 
human capital, or vice versa; and some provinces are more adversely affected by the flows of 
human capital than others (Fan, 2007). However, comparing with international migration of 
educated people, there are not many theoretical models aiming at explaining internal 
migration of educated people. It is the rural-urban migration which is mostly discussed when 
it comes to the internal migration in developing countries like China. In fact, internal 
migration of educated people is also a well-noticed problem in China recently, and it is 
considered to have hurt the poor regions and benefits the rich.  
So, a natural question next is: is the existing brain drain model suitable for the situation in 
China? In the settings of those models, residents in poor country, who decided to take 
education, are educated in their home country. This “home country effect” can be resulted 
from two facts: on one hand, the opportunity of studying abroad is rare, and residents in poor 
country neither have much freedom to choose where to be educated, nor could afford the 
expenditure in foreign countries. On the other hand, the visas offered by foreign country are 
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very limited, and to increase the competitiveness in obtaining a visa, residents in source 
country have to first finish higher education at home. Nevertheless, when it comes to the 
study of brain drain within a country, this framework seems not reasonable any more. At least 
for the case in China, youths can go to universities in whatever region they like after 
graduation from high school. The only requirement is passing the entrance examination, 
which is basically a just criterion. In this case, two steps have been evolved in the migration 
process: migration for higher education and migration for job. The two trends together decide 
the talent ratio in the whole population, and the talent ratio in labor force, not solely the 
second process. So it is of our interests to build a model in such scenario, and include all the 
potential determinants we have discussed in empirical study, and finally see how they affect 
the talent stock in a region.  
5.2 The Model 
In this model, we would like to incorporate the potential determinants we have discussed in 
the empirical studies, which are also based on previous researches. These parameters are: 
income, education cost, living cost, unemployment rate, non-pecuniary benefits.  
Assume that there is a group of people, and each of them possesses different level of latent 
ability. ei denotes the latent ability of individual i. We follow Mountford’s assumption that 
these latent abilities is distributed in the interval [0, E], and the corresponding density 
function is g (ei) (Mountford, 1997). The group of people is going to decide where to take 
higher education, and there are two regions they can choose from: region A and region B. The 
education costs in the two regions are CA and CB, respectively. Region A is more 
economically developed, so it can offer a higher starting wage WA for graduates; region B 
offers a starting wage WB, and WA> WB>0.  
We further assume that the probability of getting a job in region B is 1, regardless of where 
you graduated from. It means that as long as you want to find a job in region B, you can make 
it. The underlying reason is that region B is lack of skilled labor1. And it can result from many 
facts. For example, bad weather, low level of welfare, closed culture and out-dated industrial 
                                                        
1 By saying skilled labor, here we mean people who have a college diploma or above. 
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structure, etc. On the contrary, the competition for job in region A is very fierce: for people 
who graduate from region A, the percentage of people who succeed in finding a job there 
is Aπ  ; for people who graduate from region B, the percentage of people who could finally get 
a job there is Bπ . Aπ , Bπ  are exogenous and are determined by the economic environment 
in region A. A Bπ π>  because employers in region A prefer graduates in local universities 
since they have better information about them. Meanwhile, different individuals have 
different expectations on the probability of getting a job in region A, which are dependent on 
the levels of latent ability they possess and also where they have been educated. For people 
educated in region A, the probability function is α (ei); for people educated in region B, the 
probability function is ( )ieβ , and they have the following properties: 
(1) ( ), ( ) [0,1];  ( ) 0, ( ) 0;i i i ie e e eα β α β′ ′∈ > > ( ) ( )i ie eα β>  for all [0, ]ie E∈ .   
(2) ( ) ( ) is a decreasing function of i i ie e eα β−  
Property (1) implies that α (ei) and ( )ieβ  are both strictly increasing function of ei, which 
means if one possesses a higher level of latent ability, she will think it is easier for her to get a 
job in region A. Since individuals form their expectations on the basis of information they 
have, they also take account of employers' preference for local graduates, and that is why we 
have the last inequality of property (1). However, when the latent ability one possesses is 
higher, the difference in probabilities caused by different education places becomes smaller, 
that is what property (2) implies. 
 
There are two decisions to make for the group of people, and we will analyze them one by 
one. 
DecisionⅠ: Where to be educated? 
The group of people can be divided into two subgroups according to where they want to work, 
and it is determined by their preferences which we will discuss later. For this moment, let’s 
call people who want to work in region A “A-fans”, and those who want to work in region B 
“B-fans”. They compare the net benefit they can obtain from the two regions, and choose 
where to be educated. 
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For “A-fans”, they will choose to be educated in region A as long as: 
( ) (1 ( )) (1 ) ( ) (1 ( )) (1 )i A i B A i A i B Be W e W C r e W e W C rα α β β+ − − ⋅ + ≥ + − − ⋅ +i i i i       5.2.1 
Where r is the interest rate, and is fixed.  
The left hand side represents the expected net benefits of being educated in region A. The sum 
of the first two items is the expected income, and the third item is the education cost. 
Similarly, the right hand side is the expected net benefits of being educated in region B. 
For “B-fans”, they will choose to be educated in region A as long as: 
(1 ) (1 )B A B BW C r W C r− ⋅ + ≥ − ⋅ +            5.2.2 
Notice that the probability of getting a job in region B is 1, and since they are “B-fans”, 
expected income of them is just WB. 
If A BC C= , it is obvious that “B-fans” will be indifferent about where to be educated, and 
“A-fans” will choose to be educated in region A, because: 
i  A B( ) ( ) for all e and W >W  ( ) (1 ( )) ( ) (1 ( ))i A i B i A i Bei ei e W e W e W e Wα β α α β β> ⇒ + − > + −i i i i   
Now let us further assume CA>CB. And this is usually the case because it is more expensive to 
attend colleges in more developed regions.  
For “B-fans”, they now prefer to be educated in region B. What about “A-fans”? They will 
choose to be educated in region A so long as inequality 5.2.1 is satisfied. 
( ) (1 ( )) (1 ) ( ) (1 ( )) (1 )i A i B A i A i B Be W e W C r e W e W C rα α β β+ − − ⋅ + > + − − ⋅ +i i i i  
( )(1 )                                         ( ) ( ) A Bi i
A B
C C re e
W W
α β − +⇔ − > −  
Let ( )  ( ) ( ),  so ( ) 0.i i i ie e e eϕ α β ϕ′= − < 1 
The right hand side is positive, and if ( )(1 ) 1A B
A B
C C r
W W
− + <− , there exists an e**
2, where: 
( )(1 )( **) A B
A B
C C re
W W
ϕ − += −                5.2.3 
“A-fans” with **ie e≥  will choose to be educated in region B; and the others will choose to 
be educated in region A. The threshold level of latent ability is: 
                                                        
1 Since ( )  ( ) ( )i i ie e eϕ α β= − , ( )  ( ) ( ) 0,according to our assumptioni i ie e eϕ α β′ ′ ′= − <  
2 When
( )(1 ) 1A B
A B
C C r
W W
− + <− , the right hand side is belong to the interval (0,1), which is also the range of 
( )ieϕ .According to the Intermediate value theorem, there must exist an e** which satisfies 5.2.3. 
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1 ( )(1 )** ( )A B
A B
C C re
W W
ϕ− − += −                   5.2.4 
 
DecisionⅡ: Where to work? 
As we mentioned above, the group of people can be categorized by “A-fans” and “B-fans”, 
but we have not discussed how one type distinguishes itself from the other type. In the 
following discussion, we will show how this self-distinguish is realized. 
Assume people’s utility function is a transformation of Cobb-Douglass utility function, which 
is writt as following: 
( , ) ln ln lnu l x a l b x c y= + +  
 is leisure, and  is  comsumption goods with price p. y represents non-pecuniary benefits
(including access to medical treatment, appearance of the city,etc ). a, b and c are different 
weights which 
l x
individuals assign to different elements, and they are all positive. Notice that
 is a given value, which is determined by the development of the corresponding region, and 
individuals only choose amo
y
ng different vaules of  and .
Let L denotes the maximum hours a worker can work, W denotes the wage level,which is a 
constant for a certain region. Then the agent's maximization problem is as followi
l x
,
ng:
                                              ln ln ln
                                                    .    ( )
x l
a l b x c yMax
s t w L l px
+ +
− =
 
It is easy to derive the corresponding indirect utility function, which is: 
( , , , ) ln( ) ln( ) ln ( ) ln( )bwLv w p L y a aL b c y a b a b
p
= + + − + + 1 
Now we assume that for different individuals, c is different, and c is an increasing and continuous 
function of , ( ) 0 and ( ) (0, ). The explanation of this assumption is that individuals 
wit
i i ie c e c e′ > ∈ +∞
h higher latent ability put a greater weight on the non-pecuniary benefits.
People will prefer to work in region A as long as: 
                                  ( , , , ) ( , , , )A A A A B B B Bv w p L y v w p L y≥       5.2.5 
  where ( )and ( ) are the indirect utility functions people will have if working in region A 
and region B, respectively.
A Bv v⋅ ⋅
T
o solve 5.2.5, we have  
                                                        
1 See appendix 1. 
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             5.2.5      a ln( ) ln( ) ( ) ln  a ln( ) ln( ) ( ) lnA Bi A i B
A B
bw l bw laL b c e y aL b c e y
p p
⇔ + + ≥ + +i i       
                                 c( ) ln( ) ln( )A B Ai
B A B
y W Pe b
y W P
⇔ ≥ ii i               5.2.6 
Since region A is much more developed than region B, yA>yB, so ln( )
A
B
y
y
>0. Therefore, there 
are two cases in the solution of 5.2.6, and we will discuss it one by one. 
Case (1) : ln( )B A
A B
W P
W P
i
i ≤0
B A
B A
W W
P P
⇔ ≤  
In this case, the left hand of 5.2.6 is strictly positive, and the right hand of 5.2.6 is negative or 
zero. Thus, 5.2.6 can be satisfied for any ei. That is to say, nobody wants to work in region B; 
all of them want to work in region A. Notice that w
p
is actually the real wage in a region, and 
the interpretation of case (1) is the real wage in region B is smaller than that of region A. 
Case (2) : ln( )B A
A B
W P
W P
i
i <0
B A
B A
W W
P P
⇔ >  
        5.2.6 
ln( )
( )
(ln ln )
B A
A B
i
A B
W Pb
W Pc e
y y
⇔ ≥ −
i
i  
It can be proved that if 
ln( )
( ) ,
(ln ln )
B A
A B
A B
W Pb
W Pc E
y y
≥ −
i
i there exists an e*, which 
makes
ln( )
( *)
(ln ln )
B A
A B
A B
W Pb
W Pc e
y y
= −
i
i 1.And if 
ln( )
( ) ,
(ln ln )
B A
A B
A B
W Pb
W Pc E
y y
< −
i
i 5.2.6 will not hold regardless of ei. 
In the later case, nobody wants to work in region A. Because this is an extreme situation, 
which does not coincide with the reality in China, thus, here we focus on the first situation. 
When ei≥e*, 5.2.6 can be satisfied. So “A-fans” are those with latent ability ei≥e*, 
otherwise, they are “B-fans”. The threshold level of ability in this case is:  
                                                        
1See appendix 2. 
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1
ln( )
* ( )
(ln ln )
B A
A B
A B
W Pb
W Pe C
y y
−= −
i
i  
5.3 The effects on number of educated labor force 
We will focus on region B in this section, and see how the changes in parameters affect the 
number of educated labor force. 
Let us combine the results we have obtained in decisionⅠand decisionⅡ, there are actually 3 
scenarios 
(1) B A
B A
W W
P P
≤  ； 
(2) B A
B A
W W
P P
> and * **e e≥ ； 
(3) and * **B A
B A
W W e e
P P
> < .  
However, the first two scenarios sound not realistic. In the first scenario, everybody wants to 
work in region A because 5.2.6 holds for all ei; in the second scenario, everybody chooses to 
take education in region B, because all “A-fans” possess a level of latent ability higher than 
e**, which enables them to enjoy the lower education cost in region B. Thus, we only focus 
on the case which is more similar to the reality in China, and that is the last case. In this 
intermediate case, both regions can be a choice of people, either as place to work or to be 
educated. And we further assume that any change in any parameter will not fall into a range 
where this scenario does not hold any more. 
It is necessary to summarize the situation in the intermediate scenario here to prepare for 
further discussion. In this scenario, people with *ie e≥ want to work in region A, but some of 
them, with ( **, ]ie e E∈ , choose to take education in region B; the others choose to be 
educated in region A. On the other hand, People with *ie e< , want to work in region B, and 
also choose to be educated in region B. 
Because of the fierce competition in region A, not all people who want to work there enable to 
find a job. People who failed at finding a job in region A go to work in region B, then 
contribute to the human capital there. As a result, the number of educated labor force in region 
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B can be expressed as following: 
* **
0 * **
( , , , , , , , ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )A
e e E
B A B A B A B i i A i i B i i
e e
N w w p p y y C C g e de g e de g e deπ π= + − + −∫ ∫ ∫i i        
5.3.1 
 
 
where (1- ) and (1- ) are two kinds of unemployment rates in region A: (1- ) is for people who 
is graduated from region A; (1- ) is for people who graduated from region B. And  as we 
have dis
A B A
B A B
π π π
π π π>
cussed.
The first term of 5.3.1 is the number of “B-fans”, and the second term is “A-fans” who are 
educated in region A and have to work in region B; the third term is the number of “A-fans” 
educated in region B and also failed to find a job in region A. In fact, those “A-fans” now 
become a source of human capital in region B. It is clearly that any change in any parameters 
will lead to a change in ( )N ⋅ , which is a change in the number of educated labor force. 
To see how exactly the parameters affect the number of educated labor force in region B, we 
can calculate the partial derivatives of ( )N ⋅  , and a positive partial derivative means that 
increasing the corresponding parameter leads to gain in educated labor force in region B; a 
negative partial derivative means that decreasing the corresponding parameter leads to a 
human capital gain in labor force. 
We summarize the results in Table 5.1, and the proofs of results are given in appendix 3. 
Table 5.1 Summary of the results of partial derivatives 
Partial derivatives Sign If increase the parameter 
, , ,
B A A
N N N
y C P
∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ , B
N
W
∂
∂  positive Gain in human capital 
, ,
A B B
N N N
y C P
∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂ , A
N
W
∂
∂  negative Loss in human capital 
 
To conclude, according to the setting of this model, if there is an increase in the education cost 
(CA) and living cost (PA) in region A, the number of educated labor force in region B will 
increase. At the same time, if the non-pecuniary benefits (yA) in region A, like the culture, the 
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access to entrainment and etc increase, the number of educated labor force in region B will 
decline. And if the starting wage offered by region A goes up, it will attract more educated 
people, and region B will suffer a loss of educated labor force. The same change in the 
corresponding parameters in region B will lead to an opposite result. 
5.4 A brief discussion about the preferences 
We assumed that people with different level of latent ability assign different weight to 
non-pecuniary benefits, which will influence their choices of working place. And if we look at 
5.2.6 carefully, we will find that the weight assigned to leisure actually doesn’t matter. It is the 
combination of b and c which matters. In fact, when we tried to explain why cost is not a 
statistical significant variable in regression 4.7, we have already mentioned the possible 
existence of different preferences. Therefore, in this section, we will have a further discussion 
about modeling the preference. Notice that we still focus on the intermediate case here. 
Instead of ( )ic e , we assume that the ratio between c and b is a function of ie : ( )ic e
b
α= . 
And ( ) 0,  ( ) 0i ie eα α′> > . Therefore, to solve the inequity 5.2.5, we have: 
                     
            c ln( ) ln( )
ln( )
                  
ln( )
ln( )
              ( )             5.4.1
ln( )
A B A
B A B
B A
A B
A
B
B A
A B
i
A
B
y W Pb
y W P
W P
c W P
yb
y
W P
W Pe y
y
α
≥
⇔ ≥
⇔ ≥
ii i
i
i
i
i
 
Consequently, when people assign different weights to consumption goods and non-pecuniary 
benefits, they may choose different regions to work in. And 5.4.1 suggests that only when the 
ratio between the two weights exceeds 
ln( )
  
ln( )
B A
A B
A
B
W P
W P
y
y
i
i , there are people who want to work in 
region A. Otherwise, people choose to work in region B, despite of the higher wage, more 
non-pecuniary benefits offered by region A. 
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Now let’s jump out of the frame work we have build in 5.2, and just consider decision 
Ⅱ.Furthermore, we release the assumption that α  is a function of ie . Instead, we assume 
α  is a function of many factors, that is to say, ( )xα α= . And x is a vector which includes 
latent ability as well as some other elements. Thus, according to this way of modeling 
preference, any element in x could affect the number of educated people in a region through 
affecting people’s preference and then people’s decision about where to work. Possible 
elements include family background, social network, etc. However, we are not able to exam 
these impacts unless we have access to data in individual level.  
The best way to obtain the related individual data set may be conducting a sample survey with 
designed questionnaire. We can first ask for information about education background as well 
as other basic information which is supposed to have an association with the formation of 
preferences. For example gender, major in college, what kind of jobs parents take and etc. 
And then we can include regional characteristics in the questionnaire and ask responders how 
they value all this characters. Finally a regression could help to reveal the preferences of 
people with different education background, and also what factors have influenced the 
formation of preferences. With these results, we can make better-targeted and more effective 
policies to improve human capital stock and upgrade human capital structure.   
Because dataset described above is not available at this moment, we could not do the 
empirical study about preferences here. However, more effort can be made in this field, and of 
course should be made in the future.  
5.5 Remarks 
Discussions and results above provide some inspirations to local governments about how to 
enhance human capital development in a region. According to the results above, increasing 
starting wage for graduates, reducing education cost as well as living cost, and improving 
nonpecuniary benefits such as available public goods could all increase human capital stock 
in a region. Governments may not enable to force various organizations to increase starting 
wage, but they can use tax as a tool to adjust disposable income of individuals. However, in 
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China, each region has the same income tax system: the same threshold and the same tax rate. 
If local governments could have more freedom in adjusting income tax, less developed 
regions may have another chance to improve their situation of human capital. Comparing to 
the first approach, the last two approaches may be more feasible for local governments. There 
are many ways to reduce education cost and living cost: reduce tuitions, increase education 
subsidies, control inflation, provide low-rent apartments and etc. Meanwhile, providing public 
goods is a responsibility of government: decrease the incidences of crime, improve public 
transportation and maintain a diversity culture could all enhance the attractiveness of a region. 
Nevertheless, all these potential policies can lead to a surge in government expenditure, thus a 
more efficient allocation of government revenue should be achieved.  
Of course, as we have mentioned, this theoretical model is aimed to analyze human capital 
embedded in workforce, which we do not have relevant data either. If we want to exam the 
results of our theoretical model in the real world, we could use the similar method in Chapter 
4. However, first we need to calculate the average years of schooling in workforce and obtain 
a panel data set. Indeed, this task is of great importance in China since no one has done it. 
Average years of schooling used in most papers are referring to that in people aged over six. 
As we discussed before, to study the relationship between human capital and economic 
growth, we need human capital in workforce, not in the whole population. Thereafter, a 
progress in this field will not only help to draw a map of human capital in workforce in China, 
and also will lead to new findings in other related fields. 
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6 Conclusions and suggestions 
In this paper, we collected data during 1997-2008 of 31 regions, and built a panel data set. 
Based on it,  we studied the geographic distribution of human capital in China, described its 
status quo, analyzed how regional difference in human capital changes with time, and found 
out the main determinants of the unequal distribution. The main conclusions can be 
summarized as following: 
(1) There is a regional difference in human capital stock and human capital structure. 
Generally speaking, northern regions are better than southern regions, and eastern as well 
as central regions are better than western regions. However, not all eastern regions, which 
are more economically developed, also have an advantage in human capital; Zhejiang and 
Shanxi are good examples. Besides, percentage of people with higher education exhibits 
the highest regional difference. 
(2) Each region differs to some extent in average years of schooling, but the difference is not 
very large and keeps at a stable level during 1997-2008. Regions differ most in percentage 
of people with higher education, then that of high school education and illiteracy rate; 
regions do not differ much in percentage of people with middle school education and 
primary school education, which are included in the “Nine year compulsory education 
system”. For most of the structure indicators, the regional difference tends to decline, and 
only the regional difference of illiteracy rate and percentage of people with primary school 
education have increased.  
(3) Income, government’s education expenditure and living cost have statistically significant 
influence on average years of schooling. The affect is positive for the first two, and 
negative for living cost. However, only income has statistically significant influence on 
percentage of people with higher education, the rest two does not matter. And two 
nonpecuniary benefits indicators: the number of street lights per cities and the number of 
health personnel per 10,000 inhabitants have statistically significant impacts on the two 
dependent variables, and the impacts are positive. Unemployment rate is not statistically 
significant in the two regressions.  
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(4) According to our model of internal migration, education cost and living cost in a certain 
region are negatively related with human capital stock in labor force in the same region; 
the effects of starting wage and nonpecuniary benefits are in the opposite way.  
 
There are some interesting and meaningful finds, which provide some inspiration in making 
relative policies: 
First, government’s expenditure in higher education seems not correlated with the percentage 
of people with higher education. Although compulsory education and higher education both 
have positive external effects, the first one is made free by government while the second one 
is not. Thus, despite of government’s subsidy for higher education, individuals still have to 
pay for it by themselves. Thus, government’s expenditure may improve the quality of higher 
education, but does not encourage many poor people to take education. A possible solution for 
this is to build a complete credit system for higher education, for example, make sure that 
most students have access to low-interest education loan. By doing so, government’s 
expenditure may play a more significant role in increasing the number of people with higher 
education. 
Secondly, disposable income has strong effect on both average years of schooling and 
percentage of people with higher education. Although income is dependent on the employers, 
disposable income is actually under the control of government. An appropriate reduction on 
tax could release individuals’ budget constrain, and make taking education affordable for 
more people. 
Thirdly, construct a better information transmission system of job market. Unemployment rate 
do not affect neither of the two dependent variables in our study. Despite of the possible 
errors-in-variables, lack of full information may be a main cause. Full information could 
guide people’s behavior better, and will help to redistribute human capital in a more efficient 
way, which then could balance the development in human capital among regions 
Finally, high living cost seems not able to drive people with higher education out of big cities. 
On the other hand, non-pecuniary benefits could attract more talents and also increase the 
average years of schooling. As a result, for regions which aim at attracting more people with 
higher education, direct subsidies in living cost may not very effective; improvements 
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nonpecuniary benefits such as medical treatment level or the appearance of city may do a 
better job. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1 Derive the indirect utility function 
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Appendix 2 Proof of the existence of e* 
Since ( )ic e is a monotonic continuous function, and (0, ]ie E∈  , thus the maximum value of 
is ( )c E . If 
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Appendix 3 Partial derivatives  
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According to Leibniz's Formula, we can compute the partial derivatives as following: 
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The second term is positive, because ( )c ⋅  is an increasing and continuous function, 1( )c− ⋅  
which is the inverse function of ( )c ⋅ , is also an increasing and continuous function.  
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The second term is positive, because ( )ϕ ⋅ is an decreasing and continuous function, 1( )ϕ− ⋅ is 
also an decreasing function, which has a positive first order derivative.  
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